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ABSTRACT: Monetary fines represent an important instrument to address violations 
of Competition Law. The European Commission (EC) and the EU Courts have been 
primarily engaged in imposing fines in cases of breach of the first pillar, and have 
rarely dealt with cases of abuse based on the fining guidelines issued in accordance 
with Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003. Compared to the first two pillars, mergers 
have not received similar scholarly attention.1 2 Since 2017, the EC has expressed a 
growing interest in investigating and imposing significant fines to mergers and acqui-
sitions in breach of procedural matters. Therefore this article addresses the application 
of Article 14 of the European Union Merger Regulation (EUMR) in imposing fines to 
mergers with European Union (EU) dimension.
The EC decisions and EU Courts’ judgments related to fines on mergers in breach of 
procedural matters are discussed in four specific sections.
The first section analyses article 14(1) of the EUMR, which empowers the EC to impose 
a fine of up to 1% of the total turnover in the preceding business year on undertakings 
for breach of procedural matters, including, among others, for providing incorrect or 
misleading information. This section will address the case of Facebook as the first case 
in which the EC imposed fines based on the new EUMR. In this case, although the 
undertakings mislead the EC, based on the offered cooperation, the Authority decided 
to reduce the fine. In addition, it is also important to address the legal basis applied 
by the EC in accepting the offered cooperation as a mitigating factor and whether this 
may develop into a guiding “precedent” in the future. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Commercial Law Department, KILAW, Doha, Kuwait.
1 The transaction has a Union dimension within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the EUMR. 
2 Damien Geradin and Katarzyna Sadrak, “The EU competition law fining system: A quantitative 
review of the Commission Decisions between 2000 and 2017”, TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2017-
2018 (2017). 
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The second section deals with five cases of violations of articles 4(1) and 7(1) EUMR 
related to fines prescribed in article 14(2) EUMR. With regards to four of them, judg-
ments of EU Courts and decisions of the EC and National Competition Authority 
(NCA) are analysed. The fifth case, the one on Ernst and Young, provides for the first 
preliminary ruling on the notion of “gun-jumping”. 
The third section deals with Article 14(3) and the fining methods on mergers. By 
reviewing each of these five cases, it is important to address factors taken into con-
sideration when imposing fines. An obvious deficiency is the absence of a legal basis, 
regardless of whether manifested in hard or soft law. Here it is relevant to inquire in 
what manner the EC imposes fines and why it occasionally mirrors the fining guide-
lines applicable to other pillars of EU Competition Law. The last point to be addressed 
is the one of policy and the need to balance EC discretional powers and relevant legal 
principles such as legal certainty, equal treatment, transparency, and consistency.3 The 
fourth section provides for concluding remarks.
KEYWORDS: EUMR, fines, breach of procedural matters, gun-jumping.
1.  The case where misleading information was considered a mitigating 
factor 
Under Article 14(1)(a)(b) EUMR,4 the EC can impose on undertakings, by 
decision, fines not exceeding 1% of the total turnover in the preceding busi-
ness year for intentional or negligent conduct when providing incorrect 
or misleading information.5 In correlation with Article 4 EUMR, under-
takings have the duty to provide correct information during the notifica-
tion process and other submissions.6 It is essential for the EC to review 
mergers and acquisitions on time and effectively, searching for misleading 
3 See Frederic Marty and Mehdi Mezaguer, “Negotiated procedures in EU competition law”, in 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, ed. Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello (New York: 
Springer, 2018). 
4 Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ L 24/1, 29 January 2004.
5 Paragraph 1 of Article 14 states: “EC by decision impose on the persons referred to in Article 3(1)
b, undertakings or associations of undertakings, fines not exceeding 1 % of the aggregate turno-
ver of the undertaking or association of undertakings concerned within the meaning of Article 5 
where, intentionally or negligently: (a) they supply incorrect or misleading information in a sub-
mission, certification, notification or supplement thereto, pursuant to Article 4, Article 10(5) or 
Article 22(3)”.
6 This article specifies the details of notification prior to implementation and subsequently follow-
ing the conclusion of an agreement.
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and incorrect information.7 It is the notifying parties’ duty to make a full 
and honest disclosure of the relevant facts and circumstances to the EC.8 
Facebook9 is the very first case fined based on the EUMR for providing 
incorrect or misleading information.10 In the case of Facebook’s acquisi-
tion of Whatsapp, the EC imposed two fines on the acquirer for provid-
ing incorrect and misleading information in both the notification form 
and in the additional request for information by the EC. Only the acquirer 
has the duty to notify the concentration, therefore it was understandable 
that only Facebook was liable.11 However, surprisingly enough, the request 
for information by the EC was addressed only to Facebook and did not 
include Whatsapp although both companies should have been addressed 
at that stage of the proceedings. The registered turnover in 2016 was €28 
billion and, after reducing the fine from 1% to half, the undertaking was 
due to pay €55 million for providing false information in the notification 
form and €55 million for providing the same information in the subse-
quent request, each equal to 0.22%. The EC concluded that an overall fine 
of €110 million was proportionate and a deterrent as well.12
2. Evolution of fines 
To ensure effective control, undertakings must give prior notification of 
concentrations with a Community dimension following the conclusion of 
the agreement, the announcement of the public bid or the acquisition of a 
controlling interest.13 By doing so, the EU legislator drafted the European 
merger control to be able to prevent undertakings from implementing 
such transactions before taking a final decision, with a view to avoid any 
7 Article 4(1) of EUMR. The previous notification deadline of 7 days after reaching a merger agree-
ment was repealed with the 2004 reforms.
8 See Recital 5 of the Regulation implementing EUMR (Regulation 802/2004).
9 Commission Decision of 17 May 2017, imposing fines under Article 14(1) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 139/2004 for the supply by an undertaking of incorrect or misleading information (Case 
No. M.8228 – Facebook/Whatsapp).
10 In the past, decisions related to non-correct or misleading information were adopted under 
the old ECMR with different fine-setting. Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 (OJ 1989 L395/1, 
30.12.1989), see also Commission Decision of 27 May 1998, relating to a proceeding to Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 (Case No. IV.M993 – Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere) (1999/153/EC), 
May 27, 1998 [1999] O.J. L53/1.
11 Article 4(2) of the EUMR. 
12 The two ongoing cases concerning the alleged provision of incorrect or misleading information 
relate to Merck and Sigma-Aldrich and Ge and LM Wind. 
13 Recital 34 of the EUMR.
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permanent and irreparable damage to effective competition. A merger con-
trol is not about the protection of shareholders’ benefits, it is carried out in 
the public interest.14Article 14(2) allows the EC to impose fines on an under-
taking not exceeding 10% of the total turnover in the preceding business 
year when, intentionally or negligently, it failed to notify a concentration 
prior to its implementation, in breach of Article 4(1)15 and/or 7(1) EUMR.16 
2.1. There was a time when fines were symbolic
Previously, fines were imposed based on the former Regulation.17 
Compared to other jurisdictions, in particular the US, the recent proceed-
ings within the EU are also considered novel.18 At the EU level, the case 
of Samsung was the first case in which a fine of €33,000 was imposed for 
non-notification.19 In this case, the EC established that these fines were 
to be imposed in both intentional and negligent circumstances.20 The EC 
14 Ioannis Kokkoris, and Howard Shelanski, EU Merger Control: A Legal and Economic Analysis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 10. 
15 Article 4(1), “Concentrations with a Community dimension defined in this Regulation shall be 
notified to the EC prior to their implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement, the 
announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest”.
16 Article 7(1), “A concentration with a Community dimension as defined in Article 1, or which 
is to be examined by the EC pursuant to Article 4(5), shall not be implemented either before its 
notification or until it has been declared compatible with the common market pursuant to a deci-
sion under Articles 6(1)(b), 8(1) or 8(2), or on the basis of a presumption according to Article 10(6)”
17 Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 (OJ 1989 L395/1, 30.12.1989), as amended by Council 
Regulation (EC) 1310/97 (OJ 1997 L180/1, 9.7.1997; corrigendum OJ 1998 L40/17, 13.2.1998). Based 
on the former Regulation, the EC had already proceeded against other undertakings and imposed 
fines on them for breach of Article 7(1) of the Merger Regulation; see Samsung/AST, AP Moller and 
Electrabel/CNR. The COM has also adopted a number of other decisions on the basis of Article 14 
of EUMR; See Decisions in Cases No. IV/M.1543 Sanofi/Synthelabo (1999); COMP/M.1608 KLM/
Martinair (1999); M.1610 Deutsche Post/Trans-O-Flex (2001); CONMP/M.1634 Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries (2000); COMP/M.2624 BP/Erdölchemie (2002); COMP/M.3255 Tetra Laval/Sidel (2004).
18 Morse, M. Howard. “Mergers and acquisitions: Antitrust limitations on conduct before closing”, 
The Business Lawyer 57, no. 4 (2002): 1463-1486; Ilene Knable Gotts, The Merger Review Process: A 
Step-by-Step Guide to US and Foreign Merger Review, 3rd Edition (United States of America: ABA 
Publishing, 2006); See also Peter Alexiadis, Elsa Sependa, and Laura Vlachos, “Merger control: 
‘Around the world in 80 days: Management of the merger review process of global deals’”, Business 
Law International 19, no. 3 (2018), 240.
19 Commission Decision of 26 May 1997, Samsung/Ast (Case No. IV/M. 920). See also, D. L. D. 
Bruno, and F. V. B. Morselli, “Clarifying gun-jumping through guidelines: The Brazilian experi-
ence”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (2015): 130-134. 
20 Commission Decision of 18 February 1998, imposing fines for failing to notify and for putting 
into effect a concentration in breach of Article 4(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) 
No. 4064/89 (Case No. IV/M.920 Samsung/Ast) (paragraph 10).
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imposed a fine on Samsung for notifying the acquisition of AST 14 months 
after the transaction was closed. The second case was Moller,21 fined with 
€219,000 for notifying three reportable concentrations only two years after 
the merger. These were the first cases in which the EC declared an infringe-
ment of the standstill obligation based on the former Merger Regulation.22 
It is obvious that the amounts of these fines may be considered symbolic 
from today’s perspective. 
After a decade of silence, dramatic developments took place with the EC 
adopting decisions to impose fines on Electrabel23 and Marine Harvest24 
in the amount of €20 million in both cases, for breach of articles 4(1) and 
7(1) EUMR. 
2.2. The case of Electrabel: prima facie no competition concern 
In the Electrabel case, the EC, and the Courts ruled that Article 7(1) 
EUMR on the standstill obligation was violated.25 During the period 
between June and December 2003, Electrabel, a Belgian energy under-
taking, increased its shareholding in the French electricity undertaking 
Compagnie Nationale du Rhône (CNR) from 17.86% to 49.95% of CNR’s 
capital and 47.92% of its voting rights. At that time the acquisition was not 
notified to the EC. In 2007, Electrabel requested the EC for an opinion as 
to whether they had exercised de facto control over CNR. In the begin-
ning of 2008, Electrabel formally notified the transaction to the EC and 
was unconditionally cleared. Whether the acquirer controlled CNR was 
not addressed at that time. Taking into consideration several factors, in 
particular the share of capital consisting of 49.95% and the voting rights 
consisting of 47.92%, the EC concluded that Electrabel had acquired de 
facto control over CNR since December 2003, thus triggering a EUMR 
filing requirement. As a result, a fine of €20 million was imposed to the 
21 Commission Decision of 10 February 1999, imposing fines for failing to notify and for putting 
into effect three concentrations in breach of Article 4 and Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) 
No. 4069/89 (Case No. IV/M.969 AP Moller). 
22 Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 (OJ 1989 L395/1, 30.12.1989), as amended by Council 
Regulation (EC) 1310/97 (OJ 1997 L180/1, 9.7.1997; corrigendum OJ 1998 L40/17, 13.2.1998).
23 Commission Decision of 10 June 2009, imposing a fine for putting into effect a concentration 
in breach of Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 (Case No. Comp/M. 4994 – 
Electrabel/Compagnie Nationale du Rhone), see infra note 39.
24 Commission Decision of 30 September 2013, pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) in conjunction with 
Article 6(2) of Council Regulation No. 139/2004 (Case No. COMP/M.6850, Marine Harvest/
Morpol).
25 Judgment of 3 July 2014, Electrabel v. EC, C-84/13 P, EU:C:2014:2040.
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acquirer. This fine was upheld by the General Court ruling that Electrabel 
had violated the principle of standstill obligation as it held an effective 
majority at shareholder meetings and a majority over the board of direc-
tors since December 2003. Although the undertaking argued that this was 
only a procedural violation, this argument was rejected; stressing out that 
a failure to file a reportable transaction was a serious violation of EU com-
petition law. In this case, the Regulation concerning limitation periods for 
proceedings was applied.26 This Regulation provides a clear distinction 
between infringement of a procedural nature related to the notification of 
obligation with limitation periods of three years and infringements related 
to substantial changes in the conditions of competition with limitation 
periods of five years. Considering that the infringements of Article 7(1) 
are subject to a five-year limitation period and they are permanent since 
the limitation period that starts only at the end of the infringements, the 
General Court upheld the EC decision.27 Lastly, in 2014, the ECJ rejected 
the case in its entirety, since Electrabel was raising new arguments not 
raised in the General Court before.28
2.3. Marine Harvest: establishing principles 
While the Marine Harvest (Marine) case is pending before the ECJ, this 
article analyses the EC decision and the General Court’s Judgment. The 
decision, and in particular the Court’s review, is a thought provoking one 
to be considered as a pattern of development, since it clarifies the standstill 
obligation in bids and creeping takeovers. The second reason is that this is 
the first case fined for effectively implementing a transaction before noti-
fying it and prior to getting the approval, based on articles 4(1) and 7(1) 
EUMR. 
Marine acquired his competitor Morpol, a Norwegian undertaking 
active in farming and processing salmon. In 2012 (12 December), Marine 
entered into a share purchase agreement (SPA) with Morpol. Through SPA, 
Marine acquired 48.5% of Morpol’s market share capital. The closing of 
the acquisition took place on December 18, and Morpol did not notify the 
26 Regulation (EEC) No. 2988/74 of the Council of 26 November 1974 concerning limitations peri-
ods in proceedings and the enforcement of sanctions under the rules of EEC related to transport 
and Competition. 
27 Judgment of 12 December 2012, Electrabel v. EC, T-332/09, EU:T:2012:672, paragraph 212.
28 Judgment of 3 July 2014, Electrabel v. EC, C-84/13 P, EU:C:2014:2040.
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acquisition of more than 1/3 of the shares of an undertaking listed in the 
Oslo stock exchange, which was its duty according to Norwegian law.29 
Only a year later, in 2013 (15 January), Marine made a mandatory public 
bid under the Norwegian Securities Trading Act for the remaining shares in 
Morpol. Following the completion of this mandatory bid, two months later, 
Marine possessed 87.1% of the shares in Morpol, and consequently Morpol 
was de-listed from the Oslo Stock Exchange. Marine formally notified the 
transaction to the EC on 9 August 2013. The undertaking informed the EC 
that it would not exercise any voting rights or control over Morpol pursuant 
to the exception set forth by Article 7(2) EUMR. In these circumstances, 
the EC raised concerns that the transaction may significantly reduce com-
petition in the market for the farming and processing of Scottish salmon. 
Therefore, on 30 September 2013, the EC conditionally cleared Marine’s 
acquisition of Morpol. Finally, in 2014 (March), the authority issued a state-
ment of objections to Marine alleging that the undertaking had already 
acquired de facto control over Morpol as a result of the completion of the 
December 2012 acquisition.30 During the same year (July), the EC adopted 
an infringement decision finding that Marine had breached both the noti-
fication and the standstill obligation and imposed two fines totaling €20 
million (each €10 million). The Authority considered that the acquisition of 
the 48.5% shareholding in December 2012 conferred de facto sole control of 
Marine over Morpol, regardless of Marine trying to demonstrate that it had 
been abstaining from exercising its voting rights in Morpol prior to obtain-
ing clearance of the transaction. Although Marine argued that it could ben-
efit from the exception for the so-called “creeping bids” under Article 7(2) 
EUMR, the Authority underlined that this article applied to acquisitions of 
control by means of acquisition of shares from “various sellers” and Marine 
had acquired its shares in Morpol from a single seller only.31 The General 
Court confirmed the legality of the fine imposed by the EC on Marine.32 
Based on the Marine appeal to the General Court, a valuable judgment for 
undertakings in the market was upheld. The judicial review brought clarity 
on a number of important principles related to the application of procedural 
29 European Commission, “Mergers: Commission fines Marine Harvest €20 million for taking 
control of Morpol without prior EU merger clearance”, 23 July 2014, under “Press Releases”, http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-862_en.htm.
30 Ibid.
31 Case No. COMP/M.6850, Marine Harvest/Morpol, paragraph 7.
32 Judgment of 26 October 2017, Marine Harvest ASA v. EC, T-704/14, EU:T:2017:753. 
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aspects of the EUMR not discussed previously in this context. It included the 
principles of ne bis in idem and equal treatment,33 and further clarified the 
concepts of negligence, single concentration, and creeping bids. The Court 
in this case strictly defined the principle of negligence by stating that the 
undertaking could not be unaware of the anti-competitive nature of its con-
duct.34 In particular, it was emphasised that it may have been easy for Marine 
to foresee that the acquisition of a 48.5% shareholding in Morpol would con-
fer de facto sole control over the latter undertaking, as evidenced by Marine’s 
stock exchange announcement in December 2012 that the transaction would 
trigger an EU filing.35 The Court held that the experience of an undertaking 
in the field of concentrations and in notification procedures is a relevant fac-
tor in assessing negligence, and that particular diligence36 had to be expected 
from a large European undertaking which had already been fined (although 
at the national level) for the early implementation of a concentration.37 The 
General Court concluded that Marine acted negligently by interpreting 
Article 7(2) in a way that was not consistent with its wording, the EC’s previ-
ous practice in taking decisions, the case law of the EU Courts, and the EC’s 
statements, albeit in an obiter dictum, in previous merger decisions.38 
With regard to the principle of ne bis in idem,39 which according to 
Marine was violated by the EC,40 the General Court took the position that 
33 Judgment of 12 December 2012, Electrabel v. EC, T-332/09, EU:T:2012:672.
34 Judgment of 26 October 2017, Marine Harvest ASA v. EC, T-704/14, EU:T:2017:753, paragraphs 
237-238.
35 Judgment of 26 October 2017, Marine Harvest ASA v. EC, T-704/14, EU:T:2017:753, paragraphs 
243-244.
36 Article 14 EUMR allows the EC to impose fines for breaches of the EUMR only when such breach 
is carried out with intent or as a result of negligence. See also Emanuel Gomes, Duncan N. Angwin, 
Yaakov Weber, and Shlomo Yedidia Tarba, “Critical success factors through the mergers and acqui-
sitions process: Revealing pre‐and post ‐M&A connections for improved performance”, Thunder 
bird International Business Review 55, no. 1 (2013): 13-35. Check also Peter Howson, Due diligence: 
The critical stage in mergers and acquisitions (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2017).
37 Judgment of 26 October 2017, Marine Harvest ASA v. EC, T-704/14, EU:T:2017:753, paragraphs 
257-258.
38 Commission Decision of 21 September 2007, Merger Procedure Article 6(1)(b) Decision in 
Conjunction with 6(2) (Case. COMP/M.4730 – Yara/KemiraGrowHow), paragraph 259.
39 Bas Van Bockel, The Ne Bis in Idem Principle in EU Law, Vol. 72 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer 
Law International, 2010). See more specifically, Wouter PJ Wils, “Principle of ne bis in idem in 
EC antitrust enforcement: A legal and economic analysis”, World Competition 26, no. 2 (2003): 
131-148. 
40 According to Marine Harvest, this principle implies that where one act appears to be caught by 
two statutory provisions, the primarily applicable provision excludes all others on the basis of the 
principles of subsidiarity, see paragraph 345.  
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this principle is limited to sequential proceedings and does not apply to 
situations in which two penalties are imposed for the same conduct in 
a single decision.41 The Court agreed that the framework of Articles 4(1) 
and 7(1) is unusual since the infringement of the first article necessarily 
entails infringement of the second one. However, the two separate fines 
are imposed for breaches of two different legal provisions.42 It is odd to 
see the existence of two infringements being punishable with fines of the 
same scale43 in a situation where one infringement necessarily entails the 
other.44 Therefore, the Court concluded that ne bis in idem did not apply 
in this case.
This case also addressed the concept of single concentration linked to 
the scope of the standstill obligation; the exemption in Article 7(2) and the 
latter’s interactions with Article 7(3). Contrary to Marine’s argument, the 
Court found that the acquisition in December 2012 and the subsequent 
public offer were not different steps in a single concentration.45 In particu-
lar, in order for a single concentration to exist, control must be acquired 
by means of several legal transactions. This was not the case with regard to 
Marine’s acquisition of Morpol, in which control was acquired by means 
of the acquisition in December 2012 only.46 The EC statement that Article 
7(2), which contains a derogation to Article 7(1) for public bids and acqui-
sitions of securities where control is acquired from several sellers so-called 
“creeping bids” was maintained by the Court since it did not apply to this 
41 Judgment of 26 October 2017, Marine Harvest ASA v. EC, T-704/14, EU:T:2017:753, paragraphs 
307-344.
42 In other words, when an undertaking infringes the notification requirement in Article 4(1), 
an infringement of the standstill obligation in Article 7(1) is triggered automatically, paragraph 
302. This is because the conduct giving rise to the two infringements, the closing of a transac-
tion before notification, is one and the same, paragraph 305. See also Frederic Depoortere and 
Stephane Lalart. “Standstill Obligation in the ECMR” World Competition 33, no. 1 (2010): 103.
43 Article 14(2)(a)(b) expressly sets out penalties up to 10% of the yearly turnover of undertakings 
when they “(a) fail to notify a concentration”.
44 Judgment of 26 October 2017, Marine Harvest ASA v. EC, T-704/14, EU:T:2017:753, paragraph 306. 
45 See Section 1.5.2 of the EC Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) 
No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01). See also, 
Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law, Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 1126.
46 Judgment of 26 October 2017, Marine Harvest ASA v. EC, T-704/14, EU:T:2017:753, paragraph109. 
For the same reason, the General Court considered irrelevant that the public bid launched by 
Marine was triggered by the closing of the December 2012 Acquisition, see paragraphs 110-114; 
148-152. 
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case. The acquisition of December 2012 was simply a single private trans-
action involving only one seller.47
Another important issue was the application of regulation on limitation 
periods,48 in which the Court upheld the EC decision and provided a clari-
fication. In addition, infringements of Article 4(1) and Article 7(1) were 
subject to different limitation periods – 3 and 5 years, respectively – as 
explained in the case of Electrabel above. Keeping this in mind, the General 
Court stated that if the infringement of Article 4(1) were to include the 
infringement of Article 7(1), then an undertaking that were to implement 
a merger before notification and clearance would have an advantage vis-à-
vis an undertaking that were to implement a merger between notification 
and clearance. Given that this would have been an “absurd outcome”, the 
Court concluded that EC was right in imposing on Marine fines for both 
infringements.49 
Finally, when the principle of equal treatment was discussed by compar-
ison with an undertaking that was not fined for the same type of conduct 
in a previous decision, the Court was not willing to accept it. The judges 
held that this principle had been properly relied on only by operators who 
had not had an opportunity to take into consideration the clarification 
provided in that previous decision in order to prevent infringements of the 
competition rules, since that decision was adopted when the infringement 
had already been committed.50 
2.4.  Altice: in coherence between National and European Competition 
Authority
The case of Altice is discussed from the perspective of two competition 
authorities –the FCA and the EC – as the second followed the decision of 
the first.
47 Judgment of 26 October 2017, Marine Harvest ASA v. EC, T-704/14, EU:T:2017:753, paragraphs 
71, 75, 76.
48 Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74 of the Council of 26 November 1974 concerning limitations peri-
ods in proceedings and the enforcement of sanctions under the rules of EEC related to transport 
and Competition. 
49 Judgment of 26 October 2017, Marine Harvest ASA v. EC, T-704/14, EU:T:2017:753, paragraph 
353.
50 Judgment of 26 October 2017, Marine Harvest ASA v. EC, T-704/14, EU:T:2017:753, paragraph 
407, See Commission Decision, Case COMP/M.4730 – Yara/KemiraGrowHow.
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2.4.1. The French Competition Authority (FCA)
The decision of the FCA to impose a fine in the amount of €80 million 
represents a dramatic increase (around 400%) of fines when compared to 
the last COM decisions discussed above.51 
On 9 December 2014, Altice announced that it had signed an agree-
ment to purchase its rivals SFR and OTL in France. Altice, operating in 
France through its subsidiary Numéricable, notified two concentrations 
to the FCA: the acquisition of the SFR group – the second French telecom 
operator – and the acquisition of the OTL group, a virtual mobile phone 
operator, functioning under the Virgin Mobile brand. Since the transac-
tion met the threshold set by the French Commercial Code (Code) mir-
roring the EUMR,52 Altice was required to notify and obtain clearance 
before implementing it.
 
Under the Code, gun-jumping infringements can 
be fined up to 5% on the total turnover of one year.53 The FCA cleared the 
two concentrations subject to commitments. Subsequently, the Authority 
addressed important practices as to how the undertaking restricted the 
competition in the market while constituting gun-jumping. Three features 
were underlined: the restrictions based on the contractual conditions, the 
amount of shared information, and the future operational integration. It 
is clear that while the parties are preparing themselves for a concentra-
tion, they need to meet. However, this communication should be con-
ducted with due diligence assessments identifying the synergies.54 This 
should occur within specified boundaries, in as much as the parties con-
tinue to act independently in the market until approval is obtained. The 
teams partaking in the communication process should be external and 
anonymous.55 In this decision, for the first time the notion of “clean teams” 
51 Isabelle de Silva, the President of the FCA stated that the exchange of sensitive information is the 
key aspect, which must be taken into consideration during the evaluations of the concentrations. 
Although the exchange of information per se is not a cause for imposing a fine for Gun-Jumping, 
she underlined that it is strictly prohibited that they act as a single unit before the approval has been 
given. The president of FCA clearly specified that the shared information between the undertak-
ings were highly strategic, very recent, and very detailed about all business and strategic matters. 
Isabelle de Silva, President of French Autorité de la Concurrence, “An interview about a historic 
gun-jumping case in the country”, November 2017, https://www.womenat.com/w-at-competition.
52 French Commercial Code, Article L430-3 and L430-4. See also Hugues Calvet and Olivier 
Billard, “France”, The Merger Control Review, 7th edition (2016): 189. 
53 French Commercial Code, Article L430-3 and L430-4 Ibid, paragraphs I and II.
54 Décision no. 16-D-24 du 8 novembre 2016 relative à la situation du groupe Altice au regard du II 
de l’article L. 430-8 du code de commerce, paragraph 260.
55 Ibid., paragraphs 260 and 318.
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was discussed and considered empowering individuals not involved in the 
concentrated parties.56 Specific guidance on how the clean teams should 
operate is an important part of this decision, suggesting that these pan-
els should be composed of external advisers only. The FCA took a very 
pragmatic approach. While focusing on the SPA,57 it also addressed the 
issue from a practical point of view. The FCA concluded that the parties 
had violated the rules on exchanging information regarding their offers, 
ongoing tenders, future plans regarding prices and marketing strategies, 
sharing the list of the consumers and their data, etc. The FCA decision also 
addressed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by Altice 
and SFR, a provision of which stated that Altice could review the purchase 
price if the indicators showed the differences between the budget and the 
expenditures at the time of closing the transaction. The parties admitted 
that Altice was allowed to approve a series of investments and expendi-
tures, interfering with SFR strategic and commercial decisions participat-
ing together in a tender and in the process of signing different cooperation 
agreements with their competitors. All of these and other non-permitted 
actions were done before obtaining clearance. Regarding the OTL, or the 
second undertaking, the FCA noted that based on the MoU, Altice was 
controlling the expenditures as well. They prohibited OTL from opening 
new branches or closing important contracts with other operators in the 
market.58 The FCA concluded that Altice interpreted the provisions of the 
MoU with the “language of control” in different circumstances such as 
sharing of the information, joint purchasing, preparation of operational 
integration, etc.59 The authority established that the project between Altice 
and SFR marked a turning point in the whole strategy of SFR, forced by 
the acquirer.60 The FCA suggestion was that the merging parties could 
impose general obligations on the target undertaking only if they were 
56 “The term clean team refers to a restricted group of individuals from the business that are not 
involved in the day-to-day commercial operation of the business who receive confidential infor-
mation from the counter party to the transaction and are bound by strict confidentiality protocols 
with regard to that information”. Comission Decision of 24 April 2018 addressed to Altice N.V. 
imposing a fine for putting into effect a concentration in breach of Article 4(1) and Article 7(1) of 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Case M.7499, Altice/PT Portugal, Article 14(2) procedure), 
paragraph 53, footnote 35.
57 Share Purchase Agreement (SPA).
58 Décision no. 16-D-24 du 8 novembre 2016 relative à la situation du groupe Altice au regard du II 
de l’article L. 430-8 du code de commerce, paragraphs 200-204.
59 Ibid., paragraphs 259-260.
60 Ibid., paragraphs 113-117.
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necessary and proportionate to protect the consumers’ interests until and 
if the green light were given. Altice intervenes in commercial policies such 
as pricing policies and in the definition of SFR’s commercial policy, i.e. 
tariffs for a high-speed offer. The parties globally reinforced their com-
mercial relations and co-managed an important project concerning very 
high speed wholesale offers. In the OTL transaction, key managers were 
prematurely appointed and started acting in their new position before the 
closing. Seen globally, the parties frequently exchanged key and sensi-
tive information, for instance during regularly organised pre-integration 
meetings. It is important to underline that the FCA insisted on the fact 
that these infringements should not be given as a “checklist” to interested 
stakeholders. According to the authority, the key element in this decision 
which accounted for a very high fine was the fact that the parties showed an 
overall and complete unawareness of the rules related to gun-jumping and 
behaved, in all aspects, as if they were a single undertaking. Ultimately, in 
November 2016, the FCA imposed an unprecedented €80 million fine in 
the telecom sector for merger control gun-jumping in the takeover of SFR 
by Altice.61 It was established that the parties had cooperated too closely, a 
common feature for the two acquisitions mentioned above. This Decision 
was considered very useful in providing guidance as to what the parties 
are (and are not) allowed to take into account before deciding to merge.62 
2.4.2.  An EU perspective: opening the door for different aspects of 
Gun-jumping 
Following the FCA decision, on April 2018, the EC imposed a fine of 
€124.5 million on Altice for partially implementing the acquisition of its 
Portuguese competitor PT Portugal before EC approval. In this case, the 
EC, following a similar legal agenda based on the violation of Articles 4(1) 
and 7(1) deliberated by FCA, underlined that gun-jumping can take new 
and diverse forms such as the exchange of key and sensitive information 
discussed in FCA-Altice. In addition, it made a clear distinction between 
the possibility of exercising decisive influence and the actual exercise of 
61 Décision no. 16-D-24 du 8 novembre 2016 relative à la situation du groupe Altice au regard du II 
de l’article L. 430-8 du code de commerce, paragraphs 303-307. 
62 Commission Decision of 24 April 2018, imposing a fine for putting into effect a concentration 
in breach of Article 4(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Case M.7993 – 
Altice/PT Portugal, Article 14(2) Procedure).
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decisive influence.63 In other words, early implementation of a concentra-
tion in breach of Article 4(1) and/or Article 7(1) EUMR can arise in dif-
ferent forms, and the acquisition of the possibility of exercising decisive 
influence and/or the actual exercise of decisive influence by the acquiring 
undertaking over the target prior to notification and/or clearance of the 
transaction is only one of those potential forms of early implementation.64
As to the facts, the EC’s Altice decision arose out of Altice’s acquisition 
of PT Portugal from Brazilian telecom operator Oi, which was approved 
by the EC in 2015, subject to divestment. In 2017, the EC raised concerns 
that Altice may have partially implemented its acquisition of PT Portugal 
prior to the EC’s approval decision and, in some instances, even prior to 
the notification. Based on the EC decision, the conduct during the “grey-
zone”,65 which is the period between the signing and closing, was abusive 
Linked to the SPA, the EC emphasised that an authorisation by Altice was 
crucial in order to carry out the activities in Oi’s ordinary course of busi-
ness.66 The decision also stated that the interaction between the two par-
ties was quite frequent. In particular, the rule of gun-jumping was vio-
lated under the SPA by the influence Altice exercised over PT Portugal 
and the exchange of granular sensitive information between them.67 It was 
explained that control means the possibility of exercising decisive influence 
over the target on a de jure or de facto basis.68 The EC therefore concluded 
that, based on the SPA, Altice had the right to exercise decisive influence 
over PT Portugal before notification and approval. Altice possessed veto 
rights69 over the appointment and termination of PT Portugal’s directors 
and other executives, pricing policies and commercial terms and condi-
tions with costumers, decisions to enter or terminate or modify certain 
63 Ibid., paragraph 42.
64 Ibid., see footnote 34.
65 The term Grey-zone indicates the interim period, which considers the time between the signing 
and closing the transaction. The principle was raised in the Commission’s Decision Com. Dec M. 
7993 – Altice/PT Portugal, 50. 
66 Commission Decision of 24 April 2018, imposing a fine for putting into effect a concentration 
in breach of Article 4(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Case M.7993 – 
Altice/PT Portugal, Article 14(2) Procedure), paragraph 121.
67 Ibid., paragraphs 49-53.
68 Ibid., paragraph 43. See also, EC Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01), para-
graph 16. Check, as well, Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law, 9th edition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2018), 854.
69 Ibid., paragraph 76.
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contracts, etc. Another slightly different approach toward the notion of 
“clean teams” defined broadly in the FCA decision was that the EC took a 
narrower view.70 
Conclusively, it was established that Altice was actively involved in the 
decision-making processes at PT Portugal concerning marketing cam-
paigns, negotiation of strategies and terms of commercial contracts, future 
investments, etc. 
2.5.  Ernst and Young: a thin line between Article 7(1) EUMR and Article 
101 TFEU 
Compared to the cases discussed above dealt by National Courts and/or 
the EC such as Altice (on exchange of detailed information exchange), or 
cases such as Marine Harvest and Electrabel (failure to file), Ernst and 
Young71 comes under a specific category of gun-jumping, that of partial 
or earlier implementation based on very unique facts.72 This is the first 
preliminary ruling in which the ECJ defined the much-debated notion of 
“standstill obligation”. It was ruled out that an unlawful implementation 
of a concentration in violation of the standstill obligation can only arise 
when a measure contributes to the change of control of the targeted under-
taking on a lasting basis. 
As to the facts, on 18 November 2013, KPMG Denmark (DK) and Ernst 
and Young, both dealing with auditing activities in Denmark, decided 
to merge. During this period, KPMG DK were members of KPMG 
International, based on an exclusive cooperation agreement (ECA). ECA 
contained provisions on the allocations of customers, the obligation to ser-
vice clients, and provided that the participating firms could not conclude 
contracts such as partnerships or joint ventures. KPMG DK announced the 
termination of this agreement to take place within at least 6 months’ notice 
before the end of KPMG International’s year, which was one of the condi-
tions of the merging parties. The following step was the notification, based 
on which the Danish Competition Authority (DCA) cleared the merger. 
70 See footnote 56.
71 Judgment of 31 May 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Konkurrencerådet, C-633/16, EU:C:2018:23.
72 James Webber (Sherman & Sterling), “Gun-jumping: Practical implications of recent case law”, 
Workshop organized by Concurrences Review, in partnership with Shearman & Sterling and 
Avisa. Uploaded on 15 October 2018, https://vimeo.com/295163258. See also Massimiliano Kadar 
and Jean-Christophe Mauger, “Harvesting salmon, jumping guns: The Marine Harvest early 
implementation case”, Competition Merger Brief 1/2004, available at www. ec.europa.eu/competi-
tion/publications/cpn. 
M&CLR_III_1.indd   223 23/05/2019   15:49:19
224  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iii / no. 1 / april 2019 / 209-233
Corresponding to the EUMR73, the Danish Law74 prohibits the parties to 
take further steps in implementing their mergers before clearance is pro-
vided. This authority issued an additional decision, declaring that KPMG 
DK had breached the standstill obligation by terminating the cooperation 
agreement with KPMG International after the notification was made and 
prior to getting the approval. Based on the DCA, the termination of the 
cooperation agreement was merger-specific, irrevocable and may influ-
ence the market effect during the “interim period”. Despite that the termi-
nation only took effect 6 months after giving the notice and receiving the 
approval, costumers switched from KPMG DK to KPMG International. 
In order to determine whether the earlier and partial implementation was 
considered a breach of the standstill obligation, a clear definition of the 
meaning and the scope of the notion were required. Based on the Ernst & 
Young appeal to annul the contested Decision, the Danish Maritime and 
Commercial Court referred the questions for preliminary ruling to the 
ECJ, enquiring, among other questions, what the standstill obligation con-
cept encompassed and whether the termination of the cooperation agree-
ment produced any market effect.
The judgment on a request for a preliminary ruling was handed down on 
31 May 2018 concerning the scope of the standstill obligation in relation to 
the early termination of the cooperation agreement. It stated that regard-
less of whether the termination of its exclusive cooperation agreement 
had produced market effects, it may not be regarded as bringing about 
the implementation of concentration as such.75 In regard to the crucial 
issue on the demarcation of the standstill obligation concept, both the EC 
and the Danish Government suggested a broad definition of the notion. 
In particular, the Danish Government emphasised that internal prepara-
tory steps ought to be excluded from the scope of a standstill obligation; 
however, a broad definition would benefit all stakeholders.76 Another 
proposal worth mentioning was the negative definition of gun-jumping 
suggested by Advocate General (AG) Wahl. According to the AG, a nega-
tive delineation should be considered, more than a positive one. In other 
73 Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ L 24/1, 29 January 2004.
74 Lovbekendtgorelse nr. 869 af 8. Juli 2015, Lovtidende 2015 A.
75 Judgment of 31 May 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Konkurrencerådet, C-633/16, EU:C:2018:23, 
paragraph 60.
76 Opinion of Advocate General Nils Wahl of 18 January 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. 
Konkurrencerådet, C-633/16, EU:C:2018:23, paragraph 41. 
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words, it would be desirable for the Court to provide an explanation of 
the measures not to be caught by a standstill obligation, and not the other 
way around.77 The Court followed the pragmatic view provided by the AG 
that the main criterion to be followed was the teleological interpretation 
of “concentrations” established under EUMR.78 The “control”, defined in 
Article 3(2) EUMR, in conjunction with the jurisdictional notice, must be 
prioritised79 and, to ensure effective control, undertakings are obliged to 
provide prior notification of concentrations with a community dimension 
following the conclusion of the agreement.80 He stressed that a concentra-
tion shall be deemed to arise where a change of control on a lasting basis 
results from the acquisition by one or more persons already controlling 
at least one undertaking.81 The Court explicitly stated that Ernst & Young 
did not use any kind of control such as prices, shares or detailed planning 
and made no pressure what so ever for KPMG to terminate the agreement 
with KPMG International.82 Based on the fact that in this case the transac-
tion concerned only one of the merging parties in correlation with a third 
party, Ernst & Young stayed outside the domain of exercising control.83 
The Court specified that Article 7(1) must be based on the shift of control. 
Shift of control entails the power of exerting decisive influence, which was 
not seen in this case. The fact that KMPG individually decided to termi-
nate the agreement proved that they were in a position to make decisions 
independently. Finally, the Court ruled that an unlawful implementation 
of a concentration in violation of the standstill obligation can only arise 
77 Ibid., paragraphs 44-45. The AG also advised the Court to review the prescribed fines in the 
previous decisions on Gun-jumping. He underlined that it is highly important for the Court in this 
ruling to take into consideration the imposed fines on Gun-jumping so far, both from National 
Competition Authorities and the EC, see paragraph 43. 
78 Ibid., paragraphs 44-49.
79 EC Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 95/01). See also Philipp Werner, Serge 
Clerckx, and Henry de la Barre. “Commission expansionism in EU merger control – Fact and fic-
tion”. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 9, no. 3 (2018): 133-145.
80 This was also required by Ernst & Young referring to Aer Lingus when they provided their argu-
ments. See Recital 20 and paragraphs 62 and 65 of the Case: T-411/07, EU:T:2010:281.
81 EUMR, Article 3(1)(b) EUMR. It must be ensured that the process of reorganization does not 
result in lasting damage to competition see Recital 5, and article 3(1)(b).
82 Judgment of 31 May 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Konkurrencerådet, C-633/16, EU:C:2018:23, 
paragraphs 12-13.
83 Ibid., paragraph 61. 
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when a measure “in whole or in part, in fact or in law contributes to the 
change of control”. However, this was not the case in Ernest & Young.84
Observing the standstill obligation, the Court underlined what the EC 
stated in Altice, that both gun-jumping and standstill obligations are very 
important instruments for the EC’s effective control of mergers.85 If under-
takings jump the gun and do not notify on time, or notify partly, or they 
exchange their detailed and sensitive information, the EC will not be able 
to exercise effective and successful control.86 The pragmatic approach of the 
judges and the way the complex construction was simplified without prior 
precedents awaken the response that mergers must be treated strictly based 
on the EUMR in order for Article 101 TFEU not to be affected.87 Otherwise, 
the Court considers it an incursion of Article 101 TFEU if the standstill 
obligation notion is defined broadly.88 Instead, the limited demarcation of 
the standstill obligation in this ruling instills that if the focus is only on 
the lasting change of control, it will not provide sufficient clarifications on 
such a complex notion of competition law. Although undertakings must 
continue to act with caution, legal certainty should not be compromised. 
3. Between EC discretional powers and the scarcity of finning guidelines 
Based on the above-mentioned decisions and judgments, it is more than 
clear that Article 14(3) needs normative establishment, to say the least, by 
adopting soft law (such as guidelines) to avoid a legal vacuum.89 Article 
14(3) EUMR is broad and ambiguous, and in particular the factors enu-
merated in it must be articulated specifically.90 Fines should be imposed in 
84 Ibid., paragraph 59.
85 Ibid., paragraph 50. 
86 Commission Decision of 24 April 2018, imposing a fine for putting into effect a concentration 
in breach of Article 4(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Case M.7993 – 
Altice/PT Portugal, Article 14(2) Procedure), paragraphs 455 and 468-471, See also Pierre Honoré, 
and Guillaume Vatin. “The French competition authority’s Altice decision: Record fine for the 
first ‘genuine’ gun-jumping case in Europe”. Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 
8, 5 (2017).
87 Judgment of 31 May 2018, Ernst & Young P/S v. Konkurrencerådet, C-633/16, EU:C:2018:23, 
paragraph 57. 
88 Ibid., paragraph 58 and Advocate General opinion, paragraph 68.
89 The guidelines will also provide guidance to the NCAs. See more on the purpose of finning 
guidelines, Wouter PJ Wils, “European Commission’s 2006 guidelines on antitrust fines: A legal 
and economic analysis”. World Competition 30, no. 2 (2007): 197.
90 Ivo Van Bael, “Fining a la carte: The lottery of EU competition law”, European Competition Law 
Review 16, no. 4 (1995): 237-243. 
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accordance with the specific nature, gravity and duration of the infringe-
ment. The development of EEC competition policy followed a top-down 
approach with the European Commission designing and enforcing it at 
the same time.91 Therefore, this institution should further shape the sub-
stantive competition law on fines and fining.92
As addressed initially in the Facebook case, the EC indicated that 
both infringements were serious by nature, but noted that they did not 
have any impact on the outcome of the decision approving the transac-
tion. However, a mitigating factor was taken into consideration to make 
the EC reduce the fine based on the cooperation the undertaking offered. 
However, the cooperation principle was not accepted in the case of Marine 
or Altice. In Marine, several mitigating circumstances were excluded, such 
as the cooperation during the merger control procedure, which accord-
ing to the Court were not applicable to infringements of Articles 4(1) and 
7(1) of EUMR. These circumstances would more likely apply in cases of 
obstructions, such as Facebook/ Whatsapp, the EC explained.93 In Altice, 
the EC stated that the undertaking had replied to the request for informa-
tion to exercise its right of defense, by submitting documents, but had not 
actively assisted the authority in establishing the infringement, based on 
which Altice’s cooperation was not considered a mitigating factor.94
Since there was no exhaustive list of factors to assess the gravity of the 
infringement in Marine, the Court took into consideration the history of 
the case, in particular the fact that Marine had previously been fined at 
national level for a similar infringement,95 which could have been used as 
an aggravating factor, although it was not. The Court implicitly noted that 
91 Piet Jan Slot and Matin Farley, An Introduction to Competition Law (Bloomsbury Publishing, 
2017), 316. 
92 Pablo Ibañez Colomo, The Shaping of EU Competition Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2018), 328.
93 Judgment of 26 October 2017, Marine Harvest ASA v. EC, T-704/14, EU:T:2017:753, paragraph 
634. 
94 Commission Decision of 24 April 2018, imposing a fine for putting into effect a concentration 
in breach of Article 4(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Case M.7993 – 
Altice/PT Portugal, Article 14(2) Procedure), paragraph 604. This is another moment proving that 
although the mitigating factors are not included in any written norm related to mergers, the EC 
reflected the standard of culpability applicable to fines for procedural infringements in the fields 
of article 101 and 102 TFEU. See also Luis Ortiz Blanco and Andrew Read (eds.), EU Competition 
Procedure. Oxford University Press, 2013.
95 Judgment of 26 October 2017, Marine Harvest ASA v. EC, T-704/14, EU:T:2017:753, paragraphs 
465-466, 469, 482 and 536-539.
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the EC had refrained from considering Marine’s gun-jumping at EU level 
as a repeated offence at national level.96 The judges also noted that the EC 
took into account “mitigating factors such as the applicant having acted 
negligently rather than intentionally” and the fact that the applicant had 
“sought legal advice”.97 It was stated that the EC is allowed to consider the 
fact that a transaction gives rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility 
with the internal market amongst the factors rendering the infringement 
more serious.98 The Court agreed with the EC’s decision to consider that 
the whole period of pre-notification and examination of the concentration 
was to be taken into account for the purposes of establishing the duration 
of the infringement of Article 7(1).99
Electrabel, on the other hand, is a case that, although the transaction 
was implemented earlier, was cleared without remedies since it raised no 
competition concerns. On the question of mitigating circumstances, the 
EC noted that Electrabel voluntarily answered all of the EC’s questions. 
The high fine was imposed despite the fact that the undertaking’s infringe-
ment was unintentional in nature.100 One may conclude that this fine sends 
a clear message to third parties that a new sanctioning gate is re-triggered 
having deterrent effects.101 The above-mentioned arrangement also has 
an impact on the duration of the infringement as another important fac-
tor, as intermediate cases will not benefit from the EC’s discretion in less 
serious cases to exclude the pre-notification phase from the infringement 
period as a reward for an undertaking’s cooperation with the EC during 
the procedure.102
Marine argued that the absence of straightforward precedent providing 
a clear interpretation of Article 7(2) EUMR was excluded on the grounds 
that the absence of precedent ought to be assessed with respect to Article 
14(2) of EUMR, applied in several occasions.103 However, in light of this 
96 Ibid., paragraphs 533-534 and 539.
97 Ibid., paragraph 607. 
98 Ibid., paragraphs 483-528.
99 Ibid., paragraphs 552-578.
100 Ariel Ezrachi, EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases (Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2018), 438.
101 Judgment of 3 July 2014, Electabel v. EC, C-84/13 P, EU:C:2014:2040, paragraph 226. See also 
Dorte Hoeg, European Merger Remedies: Law and Policy (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014).
102 Ibid., paragraphs 566 and 572-573. 
103 Judgment of 26 October 2017, Marine Harvest ASA v. EC, T-704/14, EU:T:2017:753, paragraphs 
640-642. 
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limited interpretation, undertakings are thus prevented from raising the 
absence of clear precedent as a mitigating circumstance in merger cases 
in the future, the Court ruled. Concerning Article 7(1) EUMR, Altice 
brought a complaint that in absence of precedent linked to this para-
graph, undertakings cannot assess the scope of their obligations before 
closing, therefore their conduct should be considered as less serious than 
a violation of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU. Furthermore, the infringements 
of Article 7(1) EUMR should be considered less serious if the merger is 
ultimately cleared by the EC compared to cases in which the merger is 
blocked.104 However, the EC established that any infringement of Article 
4(1) and Article 7(1) of EUMR is by nature a serious infringement; there-
fore a maximum fine should be imposed.105 Altice tried to argue that the 
infringements of Articles 4(1) and 7(1) EUMR should not entail the same 
degree of gravity compared to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU since within the 
mergers the acquirer will gain some control over the target at some point 
and competitors cannot remain completely independent as it is the case 
with the first pillar. Therefore, the undertaking asked for a symbolic fine 
to be imposed considering in particular the situation of non-transparency 
and legal uncertainty faced by them at the time of the infringements.106
4. Conclusion
Although lacking detailed legal basis, the imposition of fines for infringe-
ments of procedural matters within EU mergers has evolved from sym-
bolic penalties to substantive sums amounting to tens of millions of euros. 
Therefore, there is a strong argument to be made for the adoption of a more 
detailed law on fining methods for breach of procedural matters. This is 
what the General Court suggested in the case of Marine by stating that 
there are no applicable guidelines setting out the method of calculation 
fines for infringements of merger control rules, placing all the parties in 
a difficult situation.107 In the case of Altice, the undertaking argued that, 
104 Commission Decision of 24 April 2018, imposing a fine for putting into effect a concentration 
in breach of Article 4(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Case M.7993 – 
Altice/PT Portugal, Article 14(2) Procedure), paragraph 568.
105 It must not be forgotten that the case of marine was fined 1% of their annual total turnout. 
106 Commission Decision of 24 April 2018, imposing a fine for putting into effect a concentration 
in breach of Article 4(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (Case M.7993 – 
Altice/PT Portugal, Article 14(2) Procedure), paragraph 605.
107 Judgment of 26 October 2017, Marine Harvest ASA v. EC, T-704/14, EU:T:2017:753, paragraph 
455.
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if the EC was to impose a fine, it should be of a symbolic amount hav-
ing in mind the legal requirement for legal uncertainty. Altice explicitly 
pointed out that there are no guidelines available regarding the calculation 
of fines for violations of Articles 4(1) and 7(1) EUMR, therefore the lack of 
transparency constitutes a serious breach of the principle of legal expecta-
tion. Due to the fact that there is also a lack of “precedent” in fining the 
undertakings during the interim period in particular, undertakings are 
unable to properly assess the scope of their rights and obligations during 
the pre-closing period. The legal certainty principle must not be weakened 
by institutional actions. It is well known that in the absence of rules, stand-
ards may rise. 
In the decisions discussed in this article, the EC has reflected upon the 
fining guidelines’ principles based on Regulation 1/2003. However, one 
should note that this Regulation, and in particular the fining guidelines 
based on it, concern only Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and do not apply to 
mergers.108 
The arguments related to repeated offences and the deterrent effect that 
fines may have, must also be in line with the effects those undertakings 
ultimately have in the market.109 The EC argues that the fines are imposed 
in order to prevent the undertakings from recurring to the same infringe-
ments. The second reason stated in all decisions mentioned above, is the 
need to ensure that fines have a sufficiently deterrent effect to third parties. 
These powers are guided by the general principles of EU Law applicable 
to administrative fines, particularly the principles of equal treatment and 
proportionality, and the need to ensure sufficient deterrent effect must be 
checked and balanced. 
Therefore, the question stands: how far will the EC proceed with fin-
ing before deciding to issue adjustable guidelines? Since fines are consid-
ered an arm through which the EC flies haphazardly and arbitrarily,110 the 
108 Eric Barbier de La Serre and Eileen Lagathu, “The law on fines imposed in EU Competition 
proceedings: Faster, higher, harsher”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 4, no. 4 
(2013): 326. 
109 Wouter PJ Wils, “EC competition fines: To deter or not to deter.” Yearbook of European Law 15, 
no. 1 (1995): 17-46.
110 It is proven than when mergers are under scrutiny, the direct jurisdiction through the EC plays 
the key role. Similar practice can be found in the US, where courts decide relatively few merger 
cases and therefore merger law is a prediction of what the Antitrust Agencies will do. Therefore 
the Agencies have huge discretion in formulating and enforcing the relevant norms. See more in 
Daniel Crane, Antitrust (Wolters Kluwer, Law & Business, 2014) 145. For differences in the rhetoric 
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discretional powers of this authority should be measured,111 and the only 
way to do so is by filling the legal vacuum and taking a more legalistic 
approach.112
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